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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, INTEREST GROUP
THEORY, AND THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
Jonathan R. Macey·
I. INTRODUcnON
To presume to criticize the work of a sitting Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, one needs an exceedingly powerful
intellect, a great deal of chutzpah, or a rigorous analytical framework.
As author of this essay on the juris prudence of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, I am happy to report that I am fully in command of at least
one (and perhaps two) of these qualities. Apart from chutzpah, I plan to
invoke the analytical framework of interest group theory to criticize
Chief Justice Rehnquist's work.
Interest group theory is a useful lens for viewing the Chief Justice's
jurisprudence for two reasons. First, and foremost, it constitutes a
potent analytical framework for evaluating judicial performance by
providing a comprehensive explanation of the process by which politics
determines governmental outcomes. The fate of the Republic may come
to depend on our collective ability to control that process. Second, it
seems clear that the Framers of the Constitution understood and
embraced interest group theory. Their conception of the federal
judiciary's role within the constitutional scheme was based on the
interest group model. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist's performance can,
and should, be evaluated against the norms provided by that theory.
Clearly, as the writings of my fellow panelists illustrate, the
Framers' perspective is not the only one that can be used to evaluate
Chief Justice Rehnquist's contributions to the law of the land. One
could also evaluate the Chief Justice's writings from the perspectives of
Critical Race Theoryl (whatever that is) or the extent to which the
Rehnquist jurisprudence is able "to accommodate certain
• J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
I. Jerome M. Culp, Understanding the Racial and Economic Discourse of Justice
Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1994).
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communitarian moral and civil interests along with libertarian claims for
autonomy."2
Similarly, it would be interesting to evaluate Justice Rehnquist's
opinions to determine the extent to which his decisions are consistent
with the principle of economic efficiency, or other broad social goals
such as human flourishing, or wealth maximization. In the end, I think
that Justice Rehnquist's opinions will be evaluated on the basis of
whether they helped to preserve or to undermine the guiding principles
of the Founders of the Republic.
Part IT of this essay sketches interest group theory and discusses its
jurisprudential implications. Part III demonstrates the influence of
interest group theory on the jurisprudential view of the Framers of the
United States Constitution. Finally, Part IV briefly describes Justice
Rehnquist's jurisprudence, analyzing it from the perspective of interest
group theory.
I hope to show three things in this Essay. First, that the Framers'
jurisprudential perspective was more modem and sophisticated than that
of the Chief Justice because, unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Framers had a very profound understanding of the intuitions of modem
public choice theory. Second, unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Framers understood the delicate balance between property rights and
democratic values. The Framers recognized that failure to maintain this
balance had been detrimental to earlier democracies. Unfortunately,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has exhibited no appreciation or understanding
of the critical need to balance these important values. And finally, I seek
to show that the Framers had a more profound understanding of the rule
of law than Chief Justice Rehnquist.
At a minimum, I think I can convince an unbiased reader that Chief
Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudential vision is different from that of the
Framers. I also think I can show that the Framers' jurisprudential vision
was better.
IT. THE INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF LEGISLATION
Building on economic analysis, the interest group theory of
legislation posits that "legislation is a good demanded and supplied
much as other goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups
2. Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional
Democracy, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 557 (1994).
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that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social
welfare."3 According to the theory:
[A]ll citizens are both demanders and suppliers of laws, but certain
citizens share legislative goals with highly organized interest groups
which provide them with an advantage over other citizens in the
procurement of favorable legal rules. The basic thrust of the model is that
legislatures use "taxes, subsidies, regulations, and other political
instruments . . . to raise the welfare of more influential pressure groups.
Groups compete within the context of rules that translate expenditures' for
political pressures into political influence and access to political
resources.,,4
In other words, the interest group theory of legislation takes the
view that individuals and fIrms can reach their goals through either the
competitive market or the legislative arenas. The latter option merely
transfers wealth, while the former creates it.5 To realize legislative
wealth transfers, individuals and fIrms organize into interest groups and
demand favorable legislation. Those who are most successful at
organizing into interest groups-sometimes referred to as
"distributional coalitions"-will succeed at transferring wealth from
less organized individuals and groups to themselves. As Robert
Tollison has observed, legislation is supplied by "individuals who do
not fInd it cost effective to resist having their wealth taken away ....
The supply of legislation is, therefore, grounded in the unorganized or
relatively less organized members of society."6
While exchanges of wealth resulting from consensual, marketplace
transactions increase overall societal wealth, interest groups obtaining
transfers in the legislative arena decrease societal wealth by imposing
additional costs. These costs include: (1) the costs that the transfer-
seeking interest group incurs to obtain the transfer; (2) the costs that
3. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265 (1982).
4. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 45-46 (1988) (citing Gary Becker, Pressure
Groups and Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY: SCHUMPETER. REVISITED
124 (Richard D. Cae & Charles K. Wilber cds., 1985».
5. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 477-
78 (1988).
6. Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 343
(1988).
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opposing groups incur trying to either block or pay for the transfer;
(3) the costs that arise as losing groups and firms avoid the transfer by
diverting resources to less valued, but unregulated uses; and (4) the
costs that participants in unregulated markets must incur to remain free
of interest group wealth transfers.
In a nutshell, economic actors "expend vast amounts of resources to
obtain rent-seeking legislation, to comply with it, to avoid having to
comply with it, to adjust to it, and to prevent it from being enacted in the
first place."7 The effects extend beyond the individual groups, firms,
and markets to the greater society. Mancur Olson has observed that
special interest organizations and collusions:
[(1) R]educe efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which
they operate and make political life more divisive; [(2)] slow down a
society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources
in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of
economic growth; [and (3) increase] the complexity of regulation, the
role of government, and the complexity of understandings, thereby
impeding the economic growth and development of the society as a
whole.8
The jurisprudential implications of the interest group theory of
government seem clear. Those nations able to design jurisprudential
systems that can channel and control the destructive tendencies of
interest groups will flourish. Those nations unable to control the
proclivities of interest groups to demand wealth transfers will ultimately
crumble as governments slowly but systematically remove parties'
incentives to create wealth.9 The reason that any economic activity
exists, in light of the awesome power of government to tax, regulate,
and otherwise divert the proceeds of the activity, is because the
constitutional system imposes costs on the ability of interest groups to
obtain their selfish ends.
7. Macey, supra note 5, at 479. Rent-seeking refers to the process by which groups
seek to obtain economic "rents," Le., payments for the use of an economic asset in excess
of the market price, through government intervention in the market. Paradigmatic
examples of rent-seeking include efforts by industry to obtain tariffs and quotas on
imports, and efforts by labor or industry groups to obtain legally mandated entry barriers
in the form of licensing requirements for new entrants. The income above competitive
prices earned as a result of obtaining these regulations is known as economic rent.
8. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: EcONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 74 (1982).
9. Macey, supra note 5, at 478-79.
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Thus, one way to evaluate the performance of an individual Justice
is the extent to which the Justice's judicial philosophy controls the
proclivities of interest groups demanding wealth transfers. My thesis, as
developed in Part III below, is that Chief Justice Rehnquist largely
ignores the problem of coercive wealth transfers by interest groups, and,
in doing so, contributes to the increasing social and economic instability
of the Republic.
ID. nIB FRAMERs' JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION
The Framers of the United States Constitution were quite aware of
the historical nature of their undertaking. They understood the problem
of interest groups both theoretically and historically, and were acutely
aware of the importance of controlling interest group activity. For
example, from a historical perspective, John Adams's A Defense ofthe
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America10
describes and annotates the operation of the various rep1.Jblics that
existed throughout world history. This book provided data to the
Framers about the desirability of various constitutional formulations.
Because of their historical perspective, the Framers felt an urgent
need to avoid pitfalls that had doomed previous attempts to establish
democracies with viable survival characteristics.11 These pitfalls largely
consisted of trusting in democracy too much and ignoring the
destructive influence posed by interest groups. To deal with the problem
of interest groups, the Framers, like Marx, developed a unitary "political
theory worthy of a prominent place in the history of Western
thought."12
The Framers' most important innovation was a realistic appreciation
of Homo Economicus, economic man. Previous attempts at developing
systems of self-governance faltered because of erroneous assumptions
that political leaders would be able to ignore their private interests (and
those of their constituents) and make decisions based upon the greater
good of the whole. Before the Framers' development of a new political
10. JOHN ADAMS, A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States,
in 4 nm LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 295 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Little,
Brown and Co. 1850-1856).
11. For a broader discussion of this point, see Jonathan R. Macey, Competing
Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50 (1987).
12. GORDON WOOD, nm CREATION OF nm AMElUCAN REPUBLIC, 1176-1787, at 615
(1969).
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theory, a government's success was thought to depend on the virtue of
its rulers:
Ancient and medieval thought and practice were said to have failed
disastrously by clinging to illusions regarding how men ought to be.
Instead, the new science would take man as he actually is, would accept
as primary in his nature the self-interestedness and passion displayed by
all men everywhere and, precisely on that basis, would work out decent
political solutions.13
As Bruce Ackerman cogently observed, the great insight of the
Framers was "to recognize that the future of American politics will not
be one long, glorious reenactment of the American Revolution."14 They
rejected notions of direct democracy because majority interests trammel
minority rights under such a system.15
Perhaps the most famous expression of the Framers' concern about
future political leaders of America is contained in Federalist No. 10,
where Madison wryly noted that "enlightened statesmen will not always
be at the helm" of the new Republic.16 The Framers assumed they were
establishing a constitutional framework to channel and control the
private self-interest of government officials.
Stiff penalties and diligent enforcement curtail graft and patently
illegal conduct. The greater fear is of elected officials' derogation of their
constituents' interests in favor of the goals of special interest groups
who supply political support, strategic assistance, and possible future
employment. Concerns about self-interest led the Framers to design the
Constitution with a view towards impeding interest groups from
obtaining economic advantage through the political process. Cass
Sunstein described this goal as "the most promising candidate for a
unitary theory of the Constitution."17
13. This passage appears with attribution, but without citation, in Daniel P.
Moynihan. The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Govemment, 86 PuB.
INTEREST 22, 23 (1987).
14. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution. 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1020 (1984).
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59-60 (James Madison) (paul L. Ford ed., 1898)
(in direct democracies "common passion or interest will. in almost every case, be felt by a
majority of the whole").
16. [d. at 58.
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1689, 1732 (1984).
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The Framers, for the first time in world history, had the teaching of
"[t]he new political science, based on such constitutionalists as Locke,
Hume, and Montesquieu" at their disposal. 18 They made full use of this
new science. In particular, as Walter Berns has observed:
From Locke, "America's philosopher" as he used to be called, the
Framers learned how to channel the passions and energies of men into
safe activities .... [T]he government that secures the right to pursue
happiness will be the one that, to the extent possible, leaves men alone
to do what they are inclined to do. And, according to Locke, they are
naturally and primarily inclined to seek the "conveniences and comforts
of Life."19
Contrary to present-day thinking, the laissez faire perspective of
Adam Smith also influenced the Framers. Smith was the "immediate
source" of the Federalist's idea that the goal of providing for "[t]he
prosperity of commerce is not perceived and acknowledged by all
enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a
primary object of their political cares."20
The United States Constitution is designed to channel and control
self-interest in order to promote stability and prosperity. The federalist
system creates competition among various providers of legal rules and
causes politicians to suffer citizen exit if they enact inequitable rules.
Evidence of the Framers' intentions to deal with the problem of
interest groups' rent-seeking can be gleaned from the text of the
Constitution itself. The constitutional protections of property,
commerce, the privileges and immunities of citizenship, equal
protection, and due process are all "united by a common theme and
focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or
opportunities to one group rather than to another solely on the ground
that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what
they want."21
As the Framers recognized, a straightforward implication of interest
group theory is the importance of raising the costs to interest groups
18. Harvey C. Mansfield, Constitutional Government: The Soul of Modern
Democracy, 86 PuB. INTEREST 53, 57 (1987).
19. Walter Berns, The New Pursuit ofHappiness, 86 PuB. INTEREST 65 (1987).
20. [d. at 72 (quoting THE FllDERALIST No. 12, at 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961».
21. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1689.
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trying to effectuate welfare-reducing wealth transfers. The basic
mechanism provided by the United States Constitution for raising the
costs is the system of checks and balances of which the separation of
powers is a part. As I have observed elsewhere:
[T]he very structure of the Constitution itself was designed to block the
power of legislatures to transfer wealth to special interest groups. The
structural features in the Constitution that protect property rights by
reducing the efficacy of interest group activity are as follows: (1) the
provision for a bicameral legislature in which the House and the Senate
are of different sizes and represent different constituencies; (2) the
executive veto; and (3) the provision for an independent judiciary.22
The bicameral legislature reduces the efficacy of special interest
groups by raising the transaction costs of influencing governmental
outcomes by raising the costs of collective decisionmaking within
government.23 Likewise, the executive veto raises the costs by raising
the level of consensus needed within government before action is taken.
An independent judiciary protects against the tyranny of faction by
providing a forum in which the complaints of those aggrieved by the
legislative process can be heard by an impartial tribunal. It is here, of
course, that the role of judges generally and the jurisprudence of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in particular become relevant to the political science of
the Framers.
Under the American system of separated powers, the federal
government would serve as a check on the states; the states, aided by
municipal authorities, would serve as a check on each other; and, at the
federal level, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches would
restrain one another. However, this checking function is only possible if
the will to use it exists. The executive and the judicial branches must be
willing to use their independence from the legislative branch to control,
i.e., to "check" its activities. The next section will demonstrate that the
Chief Justice's failure to understand this fact renders his jurisprudence
unsatisfying, both from the perspective of political theory, and from the
perspective of the Founders' design.
Even without interest group theory, the problem of majority
exploitation of minorities would make it important to raise the costs of
22. Jonathan R. Macey, Thayer, Nagel, and the Founders' Design: A Comment, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 228 (1993).
23. ROBERT E. MceORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION. AND
1HEEcONOMY 45-57 (1981).
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welfare-reducing interest group activity. Clearly, the Framers' strong
desire to protect property rights could not be achieved unless some
source, independent of democratic processes, could be invoked to curb
the proclivities of debtor groups to profit at the expense of creditor
groups.
The most obvious way that judges can check legislative excess is
through the power of judicial review. For example, as Erwin
Chemerinsky has argued, the inclination of the legislature to succumb to
interest group pressures has eroded the viability of arguments favoring
deference by judges to the legislative will.24 Scholars on the political
spectrum as far apart as Richard Epstein25 and Cass Sunstein,26 or even
Bernard Siegan27 and Jerry Mashaw,28 argue in favor of active judicial
review to combat the interest group problem.
Even those scholars who do not argue that judges should invoke
judicial review more readily argue that judges should at least keep the
problem of interest group transfers in mind when interpreting statutes.
In particular, I have argued that statutory interpretation can be a
powerful tool for limiting the efficacy of interest groups.29 Similarly,
William Eskridge suggests that judges construing statutes should fIrst
analyze whether the statute bears the hallmarks of an interest group
bargain by determining whether the benefits of the statute are
concentrated while the costs are distributed broadly. If so, Eskridge
proposes that the statute be narrowly construed.3O
24. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court. 1988 Tenn-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 4647, 80-81 (1989).
25. Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 703, 705-17 (1984).
26. Cass R. Sunstein,Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29(1985).
27. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, EcONOMIC LmERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 265-303(1980).
28. Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public
Law, 54 TuL. L. REv. 849, 874-75 (1980); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics
and the Understanding ofPublic Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 141·50 (1989).
29. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group ·Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 260 (1986); see also
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 37 (1991).
30. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 279, 298-99, 303-09,
324-25 (1988). For similar arguments, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Tenn-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 51-54
(1984); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REv. 405, 471, 486 (1989).
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While there are major differences in the jurisprudential approaches
of many commentators, the common thread connecting this diverse
body of work is an understanding of the problem of interest group
distortion of democratic processes. As the following section of this
demonstrates, Justice Rehnquist does not share this understanding.
IV. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, THE FRAMERS AND
INTEREST GROUP THEORY
The core problem with Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence can be
succinctly described. He has failed to pursue his constitutionally
prescribed mandate to check legislative excess.
Examples of this phenomenon abound. In City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey,31 the Court considered a New Jersey statute prohibiting the
importation into New Jersey of virtually all "solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the state."32
The only exceptions were garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New
Jersey, municipal solid waste to be processed at resource recovery
facilities, and various other chemical or hazardous wastes destined for
licensed New Jersey recycling, reclamation, or treatment facilities.33 In
other words, no out-of-state garbage could be dumped in New Jersey
landfills.
This statute was challenged on grounds that it violated the
Commerce Clause, which withholds from the States the power to
restrict interstate commerce. This clause was designed to combat
interest group wealth transfers by preventing in-state groups from
effectuating the passage of local legislation giving these groups an unfair
advantage over their out-of-state rivals.34
While the majority opinion reflected an awareness that the whole
point of Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been to combat interest
group efforts to achieve economic isolation and protectionism,35 Justice
Rehnquist's dissent does not share those concerns. As the majority
31. 437 u.s. 617 (1978).
32. ld. at 618 (quoting 1973 N.J. Laws 1, 962 (repealed 1978) (Statement of
Purpose».
33. ld. at 619 n.2 (quoting since-repealed administrative regulations issued pursuant
to the New Jersey statute; see supra note 32).
34. "What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may
not place itself in a position of economic isolation." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,
527 (1935).
35. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623.
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pointed out, the "crucial inquiry" under the Commerce Clause "must be
directed to determining whether [the relevant New Jersey statute] is
basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a
law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate
commerce that are only incidental."36
The majority had no difficulty finding that New Jersey's effort to
solve its local landfill problems by isolating itself from the stream of
commerce violated the Commerce Clause}7 Justice Rehnquist, in
dissent, took a much different view. Justice Rehnquist ignored the
possibility that interest group efforts to solve local problems through
protectionism and isolationism could have motivated the statute.38
Instead, he would have given great deference to the New Jersey
legislature's stated justifications in passing the statute. This approach to
both constitutional cases and cases involving statutory interpretation
reflects a naive view of the legislative process. Justice Rehnquist, as a
result, abandons his constitutional role as a check on legislative excess.
The statute was ostensibly passed "to preserve the health of New
Jersey residents by keeping their exposure to solid waste and landfill
areas to a minimum."39 Justice Rehnquist, however, ignored the fact
that as the supply of waste into New Jersey landfills from out-of-state
sources was cut off, competitive pressures would cause the cost of
disposal to decrease. This, in tum, would lead to more disposal of solid
waste (at the new, cheaper prices) by local concerns. Thus, it was by no
means clear that the statute would result in a diminution in the disposal
of solid waste in New Jersey. The only certainty was that the constricted
supply of waste would reduce the price of disposal to in-state producers
of waste at the expense of out-of-state producers.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp.40 provides another example of his persistent deference to the
legislative will, even in the face of rather transparent attempts at interest-
group protectionism. In Kassel, the Court examined an Iowa statute
prohibiting use of sixty-five-foot double trailer trucks within the state.41
36. Id. at 624.
37. Id. at 629.
38. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. Id. (quoting Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary
Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 473, 348 A.2d 50S, 516 (1975».
40. 450 U.S. 662 (1980).
41. Id. at 665-66.
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The plaintiff, a large national trucking company, wished to use such
trucks to carry goods through the state of Iowa.
The majority of the Supreme Court upheld lower court decisions,
holding that the statute interfered with the national interest in keeping
interstate commerce free from local interests.42 The only safety benefit
to Iowa was due to the reduction in truck traffic caused by large trucks
detouring around the State.43 In addition, a number of loopholes
benefited local interests at the expense of interstate traffic. Cities
adjoining state lines could adopt the length limitations of the adjoining
state; Iowa truck manufacturers could ship trucks as large as seventy
feet; and mobile homes could be moved by otherwise impermissible
means.44 These exception were found to weaken the presumption of
validity often accorded to state safety regulation.45
From an interest group perspective, the Iowa statute reflects a classic
manifestation of rent-extraction, a particularly venal form of interest
group oriented legislation. Rent extraction involves the imposition of
costs on certain groups by political actors solely for the purpose of
obtaining political support from those groups.46 Out-of-state trucking
companies were not an obvious source of campaign contributions or
political support for Iowa politicians. However, by passing this statute
the politicians could attract support from out-of-state interests in
exchange for acquiescence in creating exceptions to or repealing the
legislation. Iowa's strategic position on Interstate 80, the principal route
to the West Coast from Chicago and New York, and Interstate 35, an
important north-south route, put the state in a strong position to engage
in rent-extraction.
Justice Rehnquist would have upheld this senseless Iowa legislation
on the grounds that courts have only limited authority to review state
legislation under the Commerce Clause.47 He objected to cost-benefit
analysis of the legislation because:
[s]uch an approach would make an empty gesture of the strong
presumption of validity accorded state safety measures, particularly those
governing highways . . . . [This would] arrogate to this Court functions of
42. [d. at 667-69.
43. [d. at 668.
44. [d. at 665-68.
45. [d. at 669.
46. Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102-03 (1987).
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forming policy, functions which, in the absence of congressional action,
were left by the Framers of the Constitution to state legislatures.48
Justice Rehnquist confuses public policy formation with public
policy evaluation. It is clear from this dissent that the separation of
powers, to Justice Rehnquist, means keeping the judiciary out of the
legislature's way rather than the checking and balancing that the
Framers intended. Indeed, it is not clear from Justice Rehnquist's
jurisprudence why courts are needed at all, other than to perform the
purely ministerial function of making sure that the will of the legislature
is carried out on all occasions. It would appear certain that the separation
of powers is not needed since the Court is unlikely to do anything
objectionable to the legislature.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions illustrate the extent to which
his approach is at variance with the other Justices. Likewise, his
majority and plurality opinions reflect the same hyper-deference to the
political branches, and a complete disregard for the Court's role as a
curb against the awesome power of the state to do evil.
A comparison of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in two First
Amendment cases, Hustler Magazine v. Falwe1l49 and Texas v.
Johnson,50 illustrates this point. In the frrst case, evangelist Jerry
Falwell sued Hustler magazine for libel and intentional infliction of
emotional distress because Hustler had published a parody of a Campari
Liqueur advertisement entitled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first
time."51 This ad claimed that the Reverend Falwell's "frrst time" was
during an incestuous, drunken rendezvous with his mother in an
outhouse. The Court acknowledged that the Hustler magazine parody
"portrays respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and
suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when he is
drunk."52 Nonetheless, the Chief Justice found that First Amendment
protection encompasses speech that is patently offensive and intended to
inflict emotional injury. A state's interest in protecting public figures
from emotional distress53 is outweighed by the constitutional value
47. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Locomotive
Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136 (1968».
48. Id. at 691.
49. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
50. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
51. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 48.
52.ld.
53. Id. at 50.
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placed on promoting the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of
public interest and concern.54 Thus, public figures and public officials
may not recover under an intentional infliction of emotional distress
theory without the additional showing that the publication contains a
false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice."55
By contrast, Texas v. Johnson did not involve abstract principles of
constitutional interpretation, but rather the constitutionality of a particular
legislative enactment. True to form, Chief Justice Rehnquist allowed his
deference to legislative will to trump his allegiance to First Amendment
values. During the 1984 convention of the Republican Party in Dallas,
Texas, Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a political demonstration.
The finale of the demonstration took place at Dallas City Hall, where
Johnson unfurled an American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it
on fire while chanting "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on
you."56 Johnson was charged with "desecration of a venerated object in
violation of Section 42.09(a)(3)(1989) of the Texas Penal Code."57
The Court's overturning of the statute reflected a willingness to
confront a legislative surrender to the public's capricious sentiments at
the expense of constitutional values. As the Court pointed out, "[i]f
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."58
As usual, however, Justice Rehnquist sided with the state. In a
dissent that reads more like a patriotic address than a legal opinion,59 the
Chief Justice argues that constitutional values must succumb to the will
of the legislature.60 He reasons that the forces of dissent in society must
give way to popular sentiment as expressed by elected representatives.61
The only enduring principle that can be gleaned from these two
examples of Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence is that the will of the
legislature should trump abstract values such as constitutional values or
minority rights. This perspective is expressed in a wide range of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinions. He upholds state action against
constitutional challenge despite precedents to the contrary or special-
54. [d.
55. [d. at 56.
56. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
57. [d. at 400.
58. [d. at 414.
59. [d. at 423-30.
60. [d. at 421.
61. [d. at 432.
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interest influence on the enactment in question.62 He even appears
immune to basic concerns about the effects of raw emotion and popular
sentiment on the legislative process.63 At worst, he remands such action
for further fact finding, delaying resolution of the case for years.64
A 1989 case, Martin v. Wilks,65 contains an interesting example of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's response to the problems posed by interest
group intrusion in the political process. White firefighters employed by
the city of Birmingham, Alabama were challenging consent decrees that
had been reached betWeen the City and the NAACP. These consent
decrees contained goals for hiring and promotion of black firefighters.
When the City took action to fulfill their commitments under the
consent decrees, white firefighters employed by the City brought an
action charging that the City was impermissibly discriminating against
them by promoting less qualified black firefighters.
The issue in the case was whether white firefighters could
collaterally attack the consent decrees or whether they were bound by
them despite not having been joined as a party to the action in which
they were issued. Prior to the judicial hearing in United States District
Court at which the consent decrees between the NAACP and the City
were approved, notice of the hearings was published in two local
newspapers. The newspapers contained a reference to the general nature
of the decrees. At the hearing, the Birmingham Firefighters Association
appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing, but
before final approval of the decrees, the Firefighters Association moved
to intervene on the grounds that the decrees would adversely affect their
rights, but the District Court denied these motions for intervention on
the grounds that they were untimely.66
Subsequently, a new group of white firefighters brought suit
alleging that they were being denied promotions on account of their
race, and that less qualified blacks were receiving these promotions in
their stead. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that "[b]ecause ... [the white firefighters] were
neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees, ... their independent
62. See generally Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 429 U.S. 490 (1989).
63. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
64. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 223
(1984) (remanding municipal afflrmative action ordinance for further fact finding against
challenge on equal protection and privileges and immunities grounds).
65. 409 U.S. 755 (1989).
66. Id. at 759.
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claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded."67 The court went
on to note that the "strong public policy in favor of voluntary
affIrmative action plans ... must yield to the policy against requiring
third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were either
ignored or sacrificed."68
Interestingly, in affirming the Eleventh Circuit, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a five-to-four majority, stressed that in order to
protect interested groups, litigants must be duly summoned to appear in
legal proceedings affecting their interests. The Court indicated that the
mere right to voluntary intervention would be insufficient.69 Justice
Rehnquist noted that:
Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity
to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree. The parties to
a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of
relief sought in the action, and at whose expense such relief might be
granted. It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of bringing
in additional parties where such a step is indicated, rather than placing
on potential additional parties a duty to intervene when they acquire
knowledge of the lawsuit.70
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Supreme
Court, rejected the "impermissible collateral attack doctrine," which
precluded parties which had failed to intervene in prior proceedings
from collaterally attacking those proceedings.
Remarkably, it seems that, while Chief Justice Rehnquist blithely
disregards the problems posed by interest groups in the legislative
process, he appears quite sensitive to the problems posed by interest
groups in the judicial process. Clearly, Rehnquist is correct in displaying
sensitivity to the problems of interest group capture and domination of
the courts.
However, for a number of reasons, it seems clear that the litigation
process is less susceptible to interest group influence and domination
than the political process.71 First, unlike the President and members of
67. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1498 (11th Cir. 1987).
68. Id.
69. 490 U.S. at 763 (quoting with approval Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S.
431 (1934».
70. Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
71. But see Elhauge, supra note 29, at 66-87.
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Congress, federal judges are insulated from economic and political
pressures that enable interest groups to influence political outcomes in
the legislative process. Thus, despite the fact that interest groups are
likely to playa large role in the selection process by which judges are
determined, it is not at all clear that such groups are able systematically
to influence the outcomes later on. Second, federal judges have life
tenure, ensuring permanent isolation from the political process once
they are confIrmed. Thus, while the decisions of Article ill judges may
not reflect the views of the majority, at least they will not reflect the
narrow perspectives of interest groups to the same extent as the
outcomes generated in Congress. Next, Article ill of the Constitution
requires an actual case or controversy between two or more parties
before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a matter.72 Finally,
unlike politicians who simply forge their will into law, judges must
write opinions justifying the outcomes they reach. Unless these
opinions are persuasive and well-reasoned, they will be ignored. Thus,
unlike politicians and bureaucrats, who are likely only to be influenced
by powerful interest groups because rational ignorance prevents other
affected parties from galvanizing into an effective political coalition to
present their perspective, judges hear arguments on both sides of the
positions they are adjudicating.
The point here is not that interest groups have no influence on the
political process. Clearly they do. Interest groups can, for example, hire
better lawyers and expert witnesses than their opponents,73 but this
advantage has been overstated because judges and their clerks can
compensate to some extent by doing work on their own. Rather, the
point here is that Chief Justice Rehnquist's deep sensitivity to the
problems of interest group domination and control in the litigation
context, as exhibited in Martin v. Wilks, stands in sharp contradiction to
the lack of sensitivity that he displays in the context of reviewing the
outcomes generated in the legislative process generally.
Perhaps this strange dichotomy can be explained on the grounds that
Chief Justice Rehnquist trusts the Political process more than the judicial
process because members of Congress are elected, and, therefore,
reflect the will of the majority. But, as explained above, this rationale is
unappealing in light of the Framers' desire to provide a system of
checks and balances that included judicial review in order to mitigate the
72. u.s. CONST. art. m, § 2.
73. Elhauge, supra note 29, at 77.
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problem of legislative excess. This rationale is also unappealing in light
of the fact that the problem of interest group domination and control is
far more severe in the legislative context than in the litigation context.
On the other hand. perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist is aware of the
problems of interest group domination and control. If. as seems
plausible. that is the case. it stands to reason that the dichotomy between
his treatment of judicial outcomes (non-deferential) and his treatment of
legislative outcomes (highly deferential) can be explained on the
grounds that he likes the groups that dominate the legislative process.
but does not like the groups that dominate the judicial process. This
hypothesis is consistent with the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist
appears to take constitutional claims seriously in those rather rare
situations where minorities have gained an advantage over the national
majority in the political process.74
In addition. not only does he ignore concerns about the domination
by interest groups of the legislative process. his lack of appreciation for
the flaws in raw majoritarianism leads him to ignore broader separation
of powers issues. For example. the congressional power grab in the
form of the Ethics in Government Act is of no concern to Chief Justice
Rehnquist.75 This Act empowers certain members of Congress to
request the Attorney General to petition for the appointment of an
independent counsel to investigate the actions of executive branch
employees. Such separation of powers encroachments undermine the
ability of the executive branch to perform its function of checking
excesses by the legislative branch. The balance of powers is complex
and delicate. Statutes such as the Ethics in Government Act. which was
upheld in Morrison v. Olson.76 threaten to tip the balance irretrievably
towards Congress. thereby undermining the Framers' goal of curbing
legislative excess.
74. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,223
(1984).
75. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988) (holding that the Independent
Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act do not violate Article II, § 2, Clause
2 or Article III of the Constitution, nor do they interfere with the President's authority
under Article II).
76. [d.
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At this point I will emphasize that I do not view the results reached
by Chief Justice Rehnquist as always bad.77 It is important to stress that
the deficiency in Chief Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence is not that he is
mean spirited or bigoted, as some have suggested, but rather that he is
not bold enough in protecting individual rights against encroachments in
the legislature. However, this is a small qualification.
In my view, Chief Justice Rehnquist's blind faith in the outcomes
generated by the legislative process has caused him to abandon his role
in the constitutional scheme. When appropriate, he should act to curb
interest group activities and protect fundamental rights against legislative
excess. Chief Justice Rehnquist simply does not seem to understand the
most important lesson of the twentieth century, that the awesome
potential of government to do evil must be curbed. This is the lesson to
be learned from the failure of communism, the segregation laws in the
South, as well as from Pol Pot, Stalin, and the Holocaust in Germany.
While the Framers' historic work predated the horrors of
government described above, it is just as clear that they were acutely
aware of the need to control both interest group excess and popular
passion:
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many
cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view
indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the
immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of
another or the good of the whole.78
In a nutshell, the problem I find with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
jurisprudence is that he takes the view that enlightened statesmen always
will be at the helm. This is inconsistent with the view of the Framers
and the teachings of modem political theory, especially the interest
group theory of government. It is also inconsistent with the best
77. For example, a Minnesota statute pennitted taxpayers in the state to deduct some
of the expense incurred in sending their children to private elementary and secondary
schools. Justice Rehnquist rejected Establishment Clause challenges to the statute,
protecting individual rights and allowing the State to improve education by promoting
competition among schools and educators. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1982).
78. THBFEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (paul L. Ford ed., 1898).
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interests of society. To paraphrase J.G.A. Pocock, perhaps America's
foremost writer on the republican tradition, the "historical pessimism"
in American thought as reflected in the work of the Framers recognized .
that the confrontations between virtue and commerce would not always
result in a victory for virtue.79
Constitutional checks and balances are most important when good
government, in the form of compassion for the weak and concern with
virtue, is on the wane. Constitutional checks and balances in the form of
judicial review and careful attention to the traditional principles of
statutory interpretation would hardly be necessary if government was
never subverted by interest groups, political factions, and the winds of
popular prejudice. Chief Justice Rehnquist does not distrust politics
enough. He places too much faith in the legislature despite the clear
lessons of both history and modem experience.
79. JOHN G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPuBUCAN TRADmoN 523 (1975).
